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BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
AND DELEGATEDWATER GOVERNANCE IN
AUSTRALIA
MATTHEWWOOD
Studies of delegated agencies commonly emphasize the importance of accountability for these
unelected bodies to secure authority to govern. This article argues that beyond formal account-
ability measures, developing legitimacy through interaction with external stakeholders is critical
to agency authority. In doing so, the article makes a distinctive contribution by applying a new
conceptual model based on organizational sociology and identifying multiple dimensions along
which legitimacy is lost andwon, and hence authority secured. The article presents original findings
from a case study of how the Murray–Darling Basin Authority, an Australian water agency estab-
lished in 2007, attempted to achieve ‘political legitimacy’. Findings show that the Agency achieved
legitimacy via appeals to common normative/ethical values and developing commonly used
information and news outlets, despite facing opposition from stakeholders on the socioeconomic
impact of its policies. The conclusion argues that the framework can usefully be applied to other
agencies in ‘wicked problem’ policy areas.
INTRODUCTION
Delegated agencies perform crucial tasks in society, like regulating food standards,manag-
ing flood defences, and assessing the safety of drugs. They are also, however, often viewed
with suspicion in the public eye as undemocratic ‘quangos’, and hence face challenges
about how to secure consent for their policies from wider society. This article presents
original evidence of how they attempt to address these challenges, focusing on the achieve-
ment of political legitimacy. Existing research tends to use the concept of ‘accountability’
to investigate agency legitimacy issues (Bovens 2007), and focuses on formal institutional
mechanisms rather than external political support. ‘Political legitimacy’, by contrast, refers
to the acceptance of an institution’s decisions as authoritative and justified by external
actors (Bernstein and Cashore 2007).
This article suggests that deploying Suchman’s (1995) framework of types of ‘political
legitimacy’ developed by Cashore (2002) (‘cognitive’, ‘moral’, and ‘pragmatic’) can enable
a detailed analysis of how agencies secure governing authority by appealing to certain val-
ues and interests in an interactive relationshipwith actors in governance networks and the
wider public. The key argument is that by constructing (shaping, developing, and mend-
ing) their levels of political legitimacy among stakeholders, agencies can improve public
support for their work across different dimensions. This can create a sustained and stable
dialogue that supplements what Schillemans (2011) calls agencies’ broader ‘horizontal’
or ‘public’ accountability and enhances their capacity for effectively achieving ‘credible
commitments’.
This article reports results from an intensive case study aimed at developing an ana-
lytical framework for use in an international study of delegated agencies’ legitimacy. The
agency chosen was the Murray–Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), established in 2007 in
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south-east Australia. The MDBA recommends and implements water management
policies in one of the world’s most complex, yet economically and socially vital,
ecological systems: the Murray–Darling Basin. As a new agency positioned in this
‘wicked’ – complex, volatile, and politically contentious – policy area, where cooperation
from external stakeholders is crucial, the MDBA offers a useful case study of how political
legitimacy is developed and challenged.
The research was exploratory (Stebbins 2001), involving extensive original data col-
lection and analysis of how (if at all) the MDBA’s strategies could be mapped onto the
analytical framework. It proceeded first through extensively collecting secondary data
sourced through theMDBAwebsite (www.mdba.gov.au): 186MDBApublications, includ-
ing scientific research reports, brochures, fact sheets, and posters; 181 media releases; 25
MDBA e-newsletters; 23 Basin Community CommitteeMeeting Summaries; sevenMDBA
Chair and Chief Executive speeches; six Annual MDBA Reports; and five MDB Ministe-
rial Council Communiques. This built a detailed picture of external engagement strategies,
before mapping them onto the framework.
Second, the acceptance or rejection of MDBA legitimacy was determined through anal-
ysis of public usage of the MDBA’s processes (website traffic data), qualitative assess-
ment of positive/negative slanting in MDBA-related media reports and parliamentary
debates (2007–13), and a 2011 Parliamentary inquiry. A database of nearly 12,000 responses
to a 2011 stakeholder consultation and statistical data on these responses (MDBA 2011f)
were also analysed. To mitigate bias, a critical approach to data analysis was adopted,
accounting for legitimation and delegitimation (see table 2). Relationships were triangu-
lated with data collected at two MDBA events in October and December 2013 for stake-
holders, policy-makers, and academics. Hour-long semi-structured interviews were also
conducted with two senior MDBA stakeholder managers. These strongly confirmed rela-
tionships in secondary evidence, and are used here purely illustratively.
This article provides three contributions. Itmakes amethodological contribution by pro-
viding a systematic operationalization of political legitimacy in the case of a delegated
agency, setting a path for refinement in future comparative and quantitative analysis. Ana-
lytically, it contributes novel insights into how legitimacy is developed by an agency across
multiple dimensions. The MDBA sought to gain consent to its authority in multiple over-
lapping ways, including through becoming well known among stakeholders, appealing
to socioeconomic interests, and emphasizing common normative/ethical values. Lastly, it
provides an empirical contribution by showing howan agency attempts to repair damaged
legitimacy relationships, namely through stakeholder engagement and appeals to com-
mon values (moral legitimacy) with relevance to agencies in other ‘wicked problem’ areas.
The article is divided into four sections. First, it briefly reviews the literature on account-
ability as central to emergent work on the problem of agency legitimacy, before specifying
the contested concept of legitimacy as it is used in this study. It highlights how legitimacy
is a social construction, and introduces Suchman’s (1995) framework as a conceptually
systematic and empirically operationalizable approach to analysing multiple forms of
legitimacy. Second, it details the MDBA case, showing why it was chosen as salient
for examining political legitimacy. The third section presents the case study evidence,
focusing in turn on the cognitive, moral, and pragmatic dimensions. The emphasis is
on analysing the strategies pursued for achieving legitimacy, and stakeholder reactions
to those strategies. This section identifies legitimation along the ‘cognitive’ dimension
of legitimacy, although the agency faced delegitimation along the ‘pragmatic’ dimen-
sion. Moral legitimacy strategies were used to mend damaged legitimacy relationships.
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The final section addresses issues concerning the application of Suchman’s framework to
agencies, including how the conceptualization andmeasurement of ‘pragmatic’ legitimacy
strategies can be improved in further studies.
BEYOND ACCOUNTABILITY: DELEGATED AGENCIES AND POLITICAL
LEGITIMACY
There is now a voluminous literature on the plethora of ‘delegated agencies’ (semi-
autonomous ‘quangos’) at multiple levels of governance around the world (henceforth
referred to as ‘agencies’; see Greve et al. 1999). Given that these bodies are unelected,
they are often accused of being undemocratic and often subject to threats of abolition or
‘quangocide’. A range of literature has hence sought to understand how agencies can be
institutionalized better, via the concept of accountability (Bovens 2007; Schillemans 2011).
‘Accountability studies’ is a wide-ranging sub-discipline, incorporating studies of the
conditions under which public bodies are held to account, and the determinants of more
or less stringent accountability arrangements (Bovens 2007). Throughout these studies,
there is a (usually implicit) assumption that accountability ensures what Bovens (2010,
p. 954) terms ‘the exercise of public authority … Accountability as a virtue is important,
because it provides legitimacy to public officials and public organizations’ (italics in orig-
inal). This section argues, however, that accounting for how agencies become legitimate,
and hence authoritative, bodies requires not merely an analysis of the mechanisms of
‘accountability’, but also their constant and sustained interaction with the wider political
environment, which generates and sustains acceptance of their actions.
Beyond accountability
Among the various conceptualizations of accountability (Bovens 2010), Schillemans
(2008) usefully distinguishes between ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ accountability. ‘Vertical’
accountability refers to ‘traditional mechanisms of accountability’ where ‘a subordi-
nate usually reports to a superior’ (Schillemans 2008, pp. 175–76) through a range of
‘mandatory’ internal reporting and accounting mechanisms, formal committee meet-
ings, and similar arrangements between principal and agent (Koop 2014). Beyond
this ‘vertical’ dimension, in its ‘horizontal’ dimension ‘accountability arrangements
address peers, equals, stakeholders or concerns outside of the hierarchal relationship
between central government and executive agency’ (Schillemans 2008, p. 176). Horizon-
tal accountability is more ‘informal’ or ‘voluntary’ in nature, with the ‘accountor’ and
‘accountee’ being, legally speaking, on a level playing field (Koop 2014, p. 565). The
argument here is that scholars of accountability should also pay attention to the continu-
ous interactions of agencies with their external environments, because in contemporary
‘mediatized’ societies this can allow agencies to gain and sustain their authority more
effectively.
The ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ conceptions of accountability both advance our under-
standing of how agencies are embedded as authoritative governing bodies in the wider
political environment. What is particularly interesting about the evolution of this lit-
erature, however, is the movement from analysing legal to non-legal accountability.
Traditionally, as Bovens (2010, p. 948) notes, ‘the locus of accountability studies is not the
behaviour of public agents, but the way in which … institutional arrangements operate’.
The study of ‘informal’, ‘voluntary’, or ‘horizontal’ accountability offers a distinctive
break from this mode of analysis. Scholars studying ‘informal’ forms of accountability
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recognize that the emergence of complex networks of service delivery means that ‘interor-
ganizational and interpersonal behaviors’ are ‘likely to be at least as important … as
formal accountabilitymechanisms, and perhaps evenmore so’ (Romzek et al. 2012, p. 442).
This article pushes this argument further by suggesting that continuous communication
and interaction with stakeholders are critical agency activities worthy of more thorough
and extensive empirical analysis. It follows Hajer in arguing that:
Authority is … not a feature or by-product of a particular function or institutional role. In our mediatized
world … critique is easily presented, and authority is more easily lost than gained. (Hajer 2012, p. 455)
Authority here can be defined as the capacity of an agency to effectively govern (steer)
the actions of external stakeholders such that those stakeholders act to achieve goals and
objectives set by the agency. Authority is ‘claimed’, ‘achieved’, and then ‘exercised’ as a
‘collaborative endeavour’ (Hajer 2009, p. 19). In order that authority may be achieved,
stakeholders need to accept the existence of the agency and its rules (its authority) as
appropriate and justified, that is, legitimate (see below). The concept of ‘vertical’ account-
ability – where procedures and processes are created for holding agency officials respon-
sible to governmental/legislative bodies – carries with it an assumption that stakeholders
will accept the existence of the agency and its policies because the formal procedures will
(in theory) ‘assure (them) that … public organisations are on the right track’ (Bovens
2010, p. 954). However, the concept of ‘horizontal’ accountability suggests these internal
procedures and processes are not enough to assure stakeholders that the agency will act
appropriately. Rather, it suggests that agencies increasingly engage in more direct, volun-
tary forms of reporting and monitoring directly linked to external stakeholders, because
those stakeholders increasingly demand more rigorous assurance before they are willing
to accept the agency as an authority.
The argument here, following Hajer (2009, 2012), goes further to argue that a variety
of communicative strategies on an almost daily basis are increasingly important – beyond
accountability measures – for agencies to achieve authority. In a ‘mediatized’ age, the way in
which all externally facing agency actions are interpreted by the wider public is important
for understanding how successful they are in fulfilling their stated aims and functions.
As Majone (2001, p. 77) argued: ‘In the final analysis … the democratic legitimacy of (agen-
cies) depends on their capacity to engender and maintain the belief that they are the most
appropriate ones for the functions assigned to them’ (italics added). On these grounds this
article proposes to supplement the accountability literature with a focus on the continu-
ous interactions of agencies with their political environments, via the concept of political
legitimacy.
Political legitimacy
Legitimacy is a highly controversial concept in political science. As Beetham (1991)
argues, it is ‘multidimensional’, encompassing philosophical/normative understandings
of ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy, as well as empiricist meanings (the ‘belief in legiti-
macy’) originating in Max Weber’s work. The latter concept has attracted considerable
controversy for ignoring normative connotations of the term, and O’Kane (1993) even
suggests abandoning ‘legitimacy’ as an empirical concept, arguing that it is ‘essentially
circular’. Notwithstanding Bernard Crick’s (1993 [1962], p. 150) argument that legitimacy
is ‘the master question of politics’ (so ‘abandoning’ it would appear a bizarre strategy
for a profession to which it is so central), the purpose of this article is not to resolve
these myriad debates. Rather, it proceeds from an empirical interest in how particular
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political institutions – delegated agencies – interact with external stakeholders to improve
their public standing and support to become authoritative and achieve their purpose
(regulatory, policy-making, or otherwise) beyond the adoption of formal accountability
measures.
A range of literature inspired by DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991) ‘sociological institu-
tionalism’ utilizes ‘legitimacy’ as a concept to analyse how public institutions secure
consent for their policies from the wider socio-political environment. These studies
show how institutions adopt engagement strategies leading to their ‘normalization’ by
stakeholders, which improves their ‘soft steering’ capacity (Risse 2004). In relation to
delegated agencies, Carpenter (2010) shows how the American Food and Drug Admin-
istration secures its authoritative position in the drug regulation policy network by
crafting its reputation through practices of interaction with stakeholders. Similarly,
Rubinstein Reiss (2009) demonstrates the importance of stakeholder engagement to
securing agency authority in the case of electricity and communications agencies. Borrás
et al. (2007) and Klintman and Kronsell (2010) also emphasize ‘stakeholder engage-
ment’ as critical for agencies in potentially improving their legitimacy (and becoming
authoritative).
This article supplements these studies by explicitly adopting a systematic framework
of political legitimacy originally developed by Suchman (1995) for studying stakeholder
engagement by businesses, and applying it to delegated agencies. Suchman’s framework
systematized a sociological approach to legitimacy as a social process through which insti-
tutions develop external consent to their authority (Johnson et al. 2006). In this approach,
organizations such as businesses achieve legitimacy through interaction with their exter-
nal stakeholders. The critical point for Suchman (1995, p. 574) is that legitimacy ‘is socially
constructed in that it reflects a congruence between the behaviors of the legitimated entity
and the shared … beliefs of some social group’. Legitimacy is a relation between an insti-
tution and the network or field it purports to exercise authority over, and, as Black (2008,
p. 144) argues, ‘is rooted in the acceptance of (an) organization by others, and more par-
ticularly in the reasons for that acceptance’. Suchman (1995) systematized this approach
through an extensive literature review, generating a widely cited typology of multiple
ways in which businesses secure legitimacy from stakeholders – pragmatic,moral, and cog-
nitive (see below). As Black (2008, p. 138) notes, this approach is ‘in principle applicable to
… any organizations … which themselves seek to enhance their legitimacy and account-
ability’. To date, however, it has not been transferred to the study of delegated agencies.
In order to do so this article draws on Cashore (2002) and Bernstein and Cashore (2007),
who modify Suchman’s framework for the study of regulatory governance regimes using
the concept of political legitimacy. Political legitimacy is defined conceptually as ‘the accep-
tance of shared rule by a community’ – a governing institution – ‘as appropriate and jus-
tified’ (Bernstein and Cashore 2007, p. 348). Cashore (2002, p. 515) posits Suchman’s three
empirical forms of political legitimacy as follows:
• Pragmatic: Individual or collective perceptions of ‘narrow self-interest’.
• Moral: Normatively based ‘guiding values about the “right thing” to do’.
• Cognitive: ‘Evaluation that something is “understandable” or “to do otherwise is
unthinkable”’.
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Measuring political legitimacy
Measuring the three forms of political legitimacy proceeds in two steps. First, at a broad
level, evaluating the success of strategies for achieving political legitimacy should be
understood as examining the extent to which stakeholders ‘accept’ or ‘reject’ the agency’s
authority, not merely through obedience or defiance in regard to legal rulings, but through
examining gradations of acceptance or rejection of an agency’s authority. In practice this
can be measured through examining the extent of criticism aimed at the agency in the
public sphere, and positive and negative assessments of its performance. As Meyer and
Scott (1983, p. 201) state, ‘a completely legitimate organization would be one about which
no question could be raised’. Following this general assessment, the threefold framework
is used to dissect particular forms that legitimation strategies take, and the particular
ways in which they are ‘accepted’ or ‘rejected’ (see table 1).
First, the cognitive form of political legitimacy ‘is based neither on interests nor onmoral
motivations, but rather on “comprehensibility” or “taken-for-grantedness”’ (Cashore
2002, p. 520). This is observable through processes of ‘popularization (promoting com-
prehensibility) and standardization (promoting taken-for-grantedness) … or pursuing
“professionalization”, linking activities to external definitions of authority and com-
petence’ (Cashore 2002, p. 520). Assessing strategies for cognitive legitimacy involves
analysis of how an agency sets up channels of communication and information sources
aimed at external audiences such as newsletters, websites, blogs, social media, and other
communicative tools (popularization/standardization); and second, how it includes sci-
entific or technical experts in its internal processes and procedures (professionalization).
Assessment of success and failure is based on the extent to which external stakeholders
use an agency’s communication and information sources (its website, for example, or
newsletters), and the extent to which they express approval (or do not express dissent)
against the expert authorities.
Second, in its moral form, legitimacy is ‘developed … through different ideas about
what is morally acceptable or unacceptable’ (Cashore 2002, p. 519), and is observable in
appeals to common normative/ethical standards or values. Assessing the presence of
moral legitimacy strategies involves examining how externally facing agency documents
(like press releases or reports) make normative/ethical statements in order to justify
their policies. Examining whether this is successful or not involves analysing the extent
to which stakeholders express similar normative/ethical values in assessments of their
approval/disapproval of the agency.
Lastly, in its pragmatic form, ‘legitimacy-granting rests on some type of exchange
between the grantor and the grantee that affects the audience’s “well-being”, giving it a
direct benefit’ (Cashore 2002, p. 517), and is observed when agencies appeal to certain
rules being ‘in the interests’ of stakeholders. Assessments of strategies for achieving prag-
matic legitimacy will involve examining the extent to which agencies make appeals to
socioeconomic benefits in order to justify their policies. Again, analysis of success/failure
here is based upon whether stakeholders agree or disagree that the agency’s policies are
in their socioeconomic interest when agreeing or disagreeing with them.
In sum, political legitimacy is similar to the concept of ‘horizontal accountability’ in that
it involves ‘a communicative interaction between an accountor … and an accountee … in
which the former’s behaviour … is evaluated and judged by the latter’ (Schillemans 2011,
p. 389). Crucially though, political legitimacy encompasses but is not limited to instances
where the relationship is one of accountor and accountee – explicit moments where the
agency is ‘judged’. It also encompasses interaction that is more subtle, like the ‘cognitive’
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development and usage of information streams and news sources, which also lend (or take
away) external support from the agency in an implicit but nonetheless important manner
affecting its overall authority.
THEMURRAY–DARLING BASIN AUTHORITY AND THE ‘WICKED PROBLEM’
OF WATER GOVERNANCE
The case study chosen here is an in-depth case of water governance in south-east Aus-
tralia since 2007. This case is chosen, first, as an ‘ideal-typical’ case for studying political
legitimacy. Political legitimacy is crucial here becausewater governance in south-east Aus-
tralia is a paradigm example of a ‘wicked problem’ requiring consent and cooperation
among numerous governmental and non-governmental actors at multiple levels (Allan
2008). South-east Australia is home to the Murray–Darling Basin (henceforth ‘the Basin’),
one of the most significant water catchment areas in the world, containing Australia’s
three longest rivers, and covering five Australian states/territories. The Basin is vital eco-
nomically, producing one-third of Australia’s food supply, including 40 per cent of its
agriculture production. It is also ecologically fragile, containing thousands of endangered
wetlands. Managing water resources in the Basin is hence an immensely complex job, but
critical for Australia’s long-term economic and ecological sustainability (Connell 2007).
This task is made ‘wicked’, however, since the Basin is situated in a dry part of Aus-
tralia, and hence ‘has not only the lowest but the most variable and unpredictable rainfall
of any of the world’s major river systems’, and ‘demand for water’ across the Basin is
‘variable and state-contingent’ (Quiggin 2011, pp. 62–63). Such a resource-constrained con-
text clearly requires cooperation to manage water, and in such a geographically broad
and diverse system, coordination across and between levels is critical. However, political
conflicts have grown over the past century, providing a number of challenges. Commu-
nities further up the catchment area, in Queensland for example, have been accused of
hoarding water at the expense of those nearer the edge, such as South Australia (Connell
2007). Achieving cooperation inworking towards an overarching set of goals or targets for
water management is thus crucial, and demonstrates the importance, but critically not the
inevitability, of achieving ‘political legitimacy’ in this case, hence showing its pertinence
as a case study.
The Murray–Darling Basin Authority
This case is also important due to the recent creation of a new agency, the MDBA, to
implement water reforms. Over the past century Australian governments have tried
to increase cross-state coordination of water management. The 1915 River Murray
Waters Agreement between New South Wales, South Australia, and Victoria and the
Federal creation of the River Murray Commission in 1917 marked a first attempt at
‘trans-boundary water management’, replaced in the mid-1980s with federal bodies – the
Murray–Darling Basin Ministerial Council (MDBMC) and Community Advisory Com-
mittee, alongside the Murray–Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) – designed to ‘develop
a whole-of-government position on the various issues’ (Connell and Grafton 2011, p. 2).
In the past two decades this concern for coordination has heightened, particularly in
light of the ‘Millennium drought’ of 2001–09, the driest period in Australia since 1900.
Such ecological stress resulted in ‘competition for water … becoming intense’ (Connell
2007, p. 55) and therefore, as Daniell (2011, p. 413) notes, ‘the management of water is
an increasingly political process’. The number of governmental and non-governmental
stakeholders in the Basin has increased to hundreds (Wallis and Ison 2011, p. 4088).
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In 2007, theAustralian federal government responded by creating theMDBA, an agency
that replaced the MDBC and is responsible for advising on and implementing federal
policy on the Basin. The MDBA describes itself as ‘an expertise-based agency’, with its
role ‘to provide the MDBMC, Basin Officials Committee and the community with timely
information to inform decision making on the Basin’s water resources’ (MDBA 2012c,
p. 76). Amongst a number of advisory and executive functions, the MDBA was tasked
with ‘developing, implementing and monitoring a Basin plan’ (henceforth, ‘the Plan’). In
essence, this Plan sought to provide even stronger national-level coordination of state poli-
cies, intended to ‘protect the Basin’s water and other natural resources … in an integrated,
mutually supportive way across state boundaries’ (MDBA 2012c, p. 21). Developed over
five years and passed by Federal Government in 2012, the Basin Plan includes five core
aims, the most important of which is setting legally enforceable limits on extraction of
water from Basin rivers by communities and industry, termed ‘sustainable diversion lim-
its’ (SDLs) (Connell and Grafton 2011, p. 6).
The MDBA was tasked with advising ministers on the specific level SDLs should be
set at, proposing targets and monitoring implementation. In order to do this, the MDBA
‘worked to commission and collate large numbers of studies from consultants and aca-
demics, gather data, reports and models from state governments and to go about the
synthesis work … and choice options for the plan’ (Daniell 2011, p. 416). Given this highly
developed scientific evidence base, the creation of the MDBA was seen as a shift towards
a ‘centralized technocratic approach’ to Basin management (Daniell 2011, p. 416).
It could be argued that the legally enforceable nature of these reforms, and their basis in
highly scientific decision making and advisory processes, makes the achievement of ‘vol-
untary’ legitimation from stakeholders less important because of the increased emphasis
on coercive ‘centralized authority’ (Daniell 2011, p. 415). The formal accountability of
the MDBA, organized through appointment of MDBA Board officials by the Australian
Minister for the Environment, regular external auditing, reporting to parliamentary
committees and the Department for the Environment, and freedom of information avail-
ability (MDBA 2013) could also in principle give it extra protection from stakeholder
dissent, given the apparently high levels of transparency. This, however, ignores how the
‘complex, uncertain and conflict ridden’ nature of Basin management makes ‘command
and control management … insufficient’, as ‘power and resources for managing water
systems are increasingly distributed’ (Daniell 2011, pp. 413–14). As a newly established
agency, with a significantly enhanced role compared to the MDBC, the MDBA also had
a significant need to establish credibility and efficacy with actors in the governance
field with already substantial influence, such as scientists and agricultural unions,
rather than simply falling back on formal accountability arrangements as assurances of
legitimacy.
As such, the creation of the MDBA and its development of the Basin Plan should not
merely be seen as a ‘top-down’ imposition of a ‘centralized technocratic’ approach towater
governance (Daniell 2011). Rather, of critical importance is the capacity of the MDBA to
gain support from a variety of stakeholders for designing and implementing the Plan,
hence the particular centrality of achieving political legitimacy in this instance, and the rea-
son for this case study selection.
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POLITICAL LEGITIMACY AND THEMURRAY–DARLING BASIN AUTHORITY
The empirical results of the case study analysis are presented in table 2, and are expanded
in detail in the following three sub-sections. The argument is that while legitimation is
observable along the cognitive and moral dimensions, delegitimation is observed along
the pragmatic dimension. In particular, moral legitimation strategies were used to repair
the negative effects of delegitimation along the pragmatic dimension.
Cognitive legitimacy
First, along the cognitive dimension, defined in terms of successful publicization, stan-
dardization, and professionalization of the agency and its policies (row 2, column 2,
table 2), legitimation was largely achieved. Through holding public events, producing
factual brochures, commissioning scientific reports, and providing the latest news on
Basin events, the MDBA attempted to both ‘normalize’ its procedures and ‘standardize’
its recommendations for SDLs among stakeholders. These methods were successful to
the extent that stakeholders accepted the MDBA as the ‘normal’ outlet for information on
the Basin. Where problems have persisted in generating widespread standardization of
SDLs, this was due to different dimensions of political legitimacy.
First, the MDBA embarked on a significant publicization programme (row 2, column
3, table 2), emphasizing its role as the ‘single agency responsible for planning for the
integrated management of water resources across the whole Basin’ (MDBA 2009e). This
campaign involved holding public events on a variety of cross-Basin issues, such as
‘Native Fish Awareness Week’ (MDBA 2009d), which was ‘an opportunity for commu-
nities to learn about rehabilitation efforts for native fish within the Basin’, involving
‘community members and staff from natural resource agencies across the Basin … work-
ing with schools and local communities to share information about native fish’ (MDBA
2010e). Native Fish Awareness Week was an already established part of the Native Fish
Strategy adopted by the MDBC in 2003 and, by having responsibility for its organization,
theMDBA became situated as the key contact and centre of information for an established
Basin initiative.
The MDBA also produces factual publications such as brochures (MDBA 2010a), fact-
sheets (MDBA 2010b, 2011a), and posters (MDBA 2012a, 2012b) about the Basin’s wildlife,
geography, and culture, together with information on existing programmes, such as the
Living Murray project (MDBA 2011b). One prominent example of this is an ‘overview
brochure’ produced to introduce the Basin, its culture, and environment (MDBA 2010a).
The document includes factual summaries about the rivers and wetlands, plants and ani-
mals, landscapes and climates, people and agriculture of the Basin, and amap of the Basin
with pictures of endangered animal species (pp. 2–3). This is preceded by a page outlin-
ing key information about theMDBA, including its central responsibilities, its stakeholder
engagement strategy, and details of the Basin Plan (p. 1). By producing basic documents
such as the overview brochure, theMDBA positions itself as the authoritative first point of
call for Basin information and publicizes and demarcates its key roles and responsibilities.
Second, regarding ‘professionalization’ (row 2, column 3, table 2), theMDBAestablished
a ‘scientific basis for preparing the Basin Plan includ[ing] the CSIRO (Commonwealth
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization) Sustainable Yields project and the Sus-
tainable Rivers Audit, which provide extensive and detailed information on every river
valley in the Basin’ (MDBA 2009e). The MDBA’s advice on SDLs would thus ‘draw on
a breadth of expertise and experience in water, the environment, natural resource man-
agement and agriculture’ (MDBA 2009e). In practice, this has involved commissioning
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reports from third sector bodies using scientific methodologies to generate policy recom-
mendations, such as estimations of environmentally sustainable SDLs provided by CSIRO
(Young et al. 2011).
Lastly, the MDBA also produces reports and media releases that create a ‘hub’ of infor-
mation for professionals involved in Basin river management (row 2, column 3, table 2).
For example, theMDBAproduced regular updates on drought conditions (flow levels and
expected drought longevity) during 2009 (MDBA 2009f). The MDBA also issues alerts for
algal blooms (MDBA 2010d) and updates on the maintenance of infrastructure, including,
for example, ongoing repairs to locks (MDBA 2009c), as well as maintaining a blog and
social media feed.
These roles are, of course, core to the functioning of the MDBA itself, and it would be
peculiar for it not to inform local communities and relevant actors about activities that
concern them. Intentional or not, however, these functions do position the MDBA as a
central actor in Basin governance, a source of up-to-date information, and communication
hub. Hence, they can be seen as important, not only as functional aspects of the MDBA,
but central to the authority invested in it by actors within the governance network via the
‘standardization’ of those functions and their use and engagement by actors.
How effective has the MDBA been in achieving cognitive legitimacy – that is, effec-
tively ‘popularizing’, ‘normalizing’, and ‘professionalizing’ itself and its policies (Cashore
2002)? First, theMDBAhas largely been successful in popularizing itself with stakeholders
(row 2, column 4, table 2). This is, at least in part, because it evolved from, and effectively
replaced, the previous MDBC, and hence had a ‘head start’ in terms of familiarity. Effec-
tive popularization can be seen in findings from internal interviews conducted by the
MDBA ‘that Basin stakeholders regard the MDBA as a principal online source of infor-
mation about the Murray–Darling Basin and the proposed plan’ (MDBA 2012c, p. 29).
This observation is supplemented by statistics showing that ‘during 2011–12, the MDBA
website received around 33,600 visits per month (adjusted figures), almost 35 per cent
more than in 2010–11. Collectively, these visitors viewed about 144,900 pages per month
… almost twice the figure of the previous year’ (MDBA 2012c, p. 86). Moreover, in the
realm of social media, during 2011–12 the MDBA’s Twitter followers more than doubled
(from 591 to about 1,300) and the MDBA’s ‘Free Flow’ blog received 10,569 views during
the Plan’s consultation phase alone (MDBA 2012c, p. 87). The MDBA thus appears to be
a key source of information and is increasingly used as a central outlet for stakeholder
interaction regarding Basin water policy.
Second, ‘standardization’ (row 2, column 4, table 2) has also been effective to the extent
that, ‘most people have now accepted the Plan’ (interview, MDBA stakeholder manager,
November 2013). In particular, SDLs are being incorporated into Basin States’ water
resource strategies, due to come into force in 2019. This is, of course, a requirement of
law; however, the acceptance of SDLs as ‘taken for granted’ on the basis of scientific
expertise has only been partial. In responses to consultation, for example, state govern-
ments expressed ‘serious concerns regarding the scientific basis of the SDLs’ (MDBMC
2012a, p. 1), and that ‘these water reductions should be examined … to determine if
the volumes proposed are scientifically justified or alternatively determine that the SDLs
need revision’ (MDBMC 2012b, p. 4).
Concerns were also expressed at a more local level; for instance, in the Federal House of
Representatives, MP Michael McCormack noted that ‘The irrigators in my electorate …
are understandably outraged … We will not cop this amount of water being taken out
of our system and put down the river for no environment gain’ (McCormack 2012). Such
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concerns are, arguably, rooted in deeper considerations of the socioeconomic implications
of the Plan for Basin communities, arising from diverse, and often conflicting, contextual
factors. As such, it can be suggested that difficulties in gainingwidespread standardization
of SDLs may be related to other dimensions of legitimacy, specifically those related to
contextual considerations of stakeholders’ individual circumstances and related interests.
For now, however, the key point is that cognitive legitimacy was largely achieved by the
MDBA, a point which is reinforced through a focus on moral legitimacy.
Moral legitimacy
The MDBA has attempted to achieve ‘moral legitimacy’, defined as consent to authority
based on normative/ethical values, by appealing to two sets of higher-order normative
goals (row 3, table 2). These can be characterized as ‘sustainability’ and ‘communitar-
ianism’. The argument is that the MDBA achieved legitimation along this dimension,
especially in re-engaging stakeholders in the wake of discontent around the publication of
the Basin Plan in 2010. However, difficulties in terms of a perceived ‘rhetoric–reality gap’
among stakeholders with regard to the professed communitarian values of the MDBA
raise further questions about the importance of contextual factors, and the presence of
delegitimating pressures.
The first MDBA Annual Report emphasized four strategic goals:
• tackling climate change
• supporting healthy rivers
• using water wisely
• securing our water supplies (MDBA 2009a, p. xi).
These goals contain appeals to two sets of values: ‘communitarianism’ and ‘sustainabil-
ity’. Communitarianism is appealed to by the first and fourth points, referring essentially
to the need for the value of collective community action and solidarity, implicit in the
demand for ‘tackling’ shared problems and ‘securing’ common resources. Communitar-
ian appeals can be found in various statements of MDBA principles. For example, in a
draft of the Basin Plan, the need for a ‘healthy working Basin’ is expanded as follows:
Strong and vibrant communities with sufficient water of suitable quality for drinking and domestic use
(including in times of drought), as well as for cultural and recreational purposes. (MDBA 2011c, p. 2)
The appeals to ‘strong and vibrant communities’ clearly denote a normative focus on
achieving a common, collective good, as MDBA Chair Craig Knowles’ speech to a local
Basin community event shows:
It’s about timewe got it right, that the processes of buyback and infrastructure funding and state government
programs as well as the role and functions of the environmental water holders at Commonwealth and State
levels be better aligned and more streamlined to serve and benefit communities rather than tie them up in
more red tape. (Knowles 2011a)
‘Serving communities’ has been an especially prevalent line since a draft Guide to
the Basin Plan (henceforth ‘The Guide’) provoked political backlash in October 2010
(see below). Press releases sought to assure that ‘we are moving toward a Plan that will
seek balance, respect communities’ (MDBA, 2011g) and emphasize the importance of
‘community feedback’ in the Plan’s implementation. Knowles further acknowledged the
importance of communitarian values in a December 2011 speech:
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We have made it very clear that our plan says there should be a bias towards investment in infrastructure as
opposed to taking water out of communities. It’s a very clear statement of principal [sic] in the belief that as
we have seen somany times, by investing in communities, you not only get an economic and social dividend,
you get an environmental return. (Knowles 2011b)
This focus on the ‘environmental return’ leads to the second moral emphasis on ‘sus-
tainability’ (second and third points), which refers to the normative stance of sustaining
natural environments and their reproductive capacities (row 3, column 3, table 2). Doc-
uments consistently emphasize the importance of ‘healthy and diverse ecosystems with
rivers regularly connected to their creeks, billabongs and floodplains, and ultimately, the
ocean’ (MDBA 2011c, p. 2). Appeals to maintaining a ‘healthy working Basin’ (MDBA
2011d), a ‘balance between the environment, economies and communities’ (MDBA 2012d,
p. i), and respect for ‘the precious resource’ (Knowles 2012) are common rhetorical themes,
and ‘health’ and ‘sustainability’ are closely linked:
As the Basin Plan is implemented, it will be critical to incorporate new knowledge from ongoing research and
to make future changes to the plan based on this knowledge and the experiences gained as we progressively
move to a more sustainable and healthy Basin. (MDBA 2011e, p. 64, italics added)
These latter narratives were strongly successful, feeding into and reinforcing existing
norms among the general public (row 3, column 4, table 2). Consultation responses show
agreement on the principle of environmental sustainability among respondents not affil-
iated with environmental campaigns (MDBA 2011f). Out of all responses that were not
associated with political campaign organizations, 71 per cent supported sustainability as
a goal, while 7 per cent of total respondents believed the Basin Plan did not go far enough
in pursuing sustainability, but they still supported the Plan overall (MDBA 2011f, p. 8).
Amongst respondents affiliated with political campaigns, support for sustainability was
even higher, at 86 per cent, with 19 per cent advocating the need to go further (MDBA
2011f, p. 8). Respondents are also broken down geographically and, amongst those from
within the Basin, 73 per cent supported the overarching sustainability values, with 33 per
cent suggesting the need to go further (MDBA2011f, p. 8). As such, it can be argued that the
MDBA was successful in its sustainability narrative to the extent that it tied in with, and
reinforced, existing and developing beliefs about sustainability among Basin stakeholders
and consequently garnered substantial support for those aims.
Regarding communitarian narratives, however, it can be argued that there was a sig-
nificant disjuncture between the professed values and ‘reality’ as viewed by respondents
(row 3, column 4, table 2). The MDBA acknowledged, for example, that there was ‘a sense
of “reform fatigue”, a lack of trust and concern that consultation was not genuine’ (MDBA
2011f, p. 6).
Importantly, theMDBA subsequently sought to appealmore to ‘localism’ and the intrin-
sic value of community (row 3, column 3, table 2). One key example was the Yarn on
the River project, a consultation with indigenous communities guided by ‘localism’ or
‘involving communities in developing and implementing water reforms so that they have
ownership of decisions and actions’ (MDBA 2012d, p. 14). This consultation developed
the notion of ‘cultural flows’, that is, ‘an important and respectful acknowledgement of
(indigenous) culture, traditional knowledge, and spiritual attachment to place’ translated
‘into the language of water planning and management’ (MDBA 2012d, p. 26).
As intimated above, this communitarian narrative developed primarily in response to
feedback on an initial Guide. This suggests that certain ‘moral’ strategiesmay seek tomend
damaged legitimacy relationships, a point returned to in the conclusion.
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Pragmatic legitimacy
The dimensions analysed above – cognitive and moral – both largely saw legitimation of
the MDBA and the Basin plan. However, this ‘acceptance’ was not total and appeals to
communitarian values and ‘professionalization’ was more problematic. Here, it is argued
that this was because of delegitimation along the pragmatic dimension when a Basin Plan
Guide was released (row 4, table 2). This was because the MDBA did not actively appeal
to the socioeconomic benefits of the Plan, and its potential impact was a significant area
of ‘push back’ from Basin stakeholders, despite an initial programme of consultation. In
this period, there was a lack of attempts at showing stakeholders that the Plan was in their
interests, followed by angry protests against the Plan when the Guide came out.
The first point is that there was relatively little attempt to achieve legitimacy through
appeals to socioeconomic benefits (row 4, column 3, table 2). To an extent, a brief ‘infor-
mation session tour’ (Daniell 2011, p. 416), advertised as offering opportunities for
‘local communities (to) be able to discuss the guide with senior Authority staff’, could
be seen as appealing to socioeconomic interests (MDBA Basin News e-Letter Issue 7,
August–September 2010). Engagement activities in the Basin Plan development included,
for example:
• individual meetings with stakeholder groups and communities
• presentations, discussions, and information stands
• digital communications including MDBA website, on-line forums, and blogs
• comprehensive regional workshops (MDBA 2009b, p. 4).
These engagement strategies were intended to ‘acknowledge and value people’s contri-
bution to the planning process’ and hence ‘increase people’s understanding of the Basin
Plan issues’ (MDBA 2009b, p. 4). These intentions might be seen as a way of promoting
pragmatic legitimacy by providing stakeholderswith ‘input’ into the decisionmaking pro-
cess, although they were more implicit attempts than systematic strategies.
This engagement strategy, however, ‘receivedwidespread criticism from, and distressed
many of, the (Basin’s) stakeholders’ (Daniell 2011, p. 416). When an initial Guide was
released in October 2010 (MDBA 2010c), there was ‘an angry backlash’ (Kelly 2010). News-
papers reported how farmers and local communities feared the Plan ‘couldwipe out 16 per
cent of the irrigated agriculture industry – worth up to $1 billion a year – and have severe
social and economic impacts on rural communities in the nation’s foodbowl’ (Franklin
and Karvelas 2010). One widely reported incident saw the burning of paper copies of the
Guide in Griffith, New South Wales (Kelly 2010). As one official noted: ‘it [the MDBA]
got clobbered for it [the Guide], absolutely clobbered … you saw a lot of politics flare
up’ (MDBfutures workshop, October 2013). This political pressure led to a parliamentary
inquiry that noted a ‘reduction in business confidence’ (Windsor Report 2011, p. 2):
TheMDBAwasmet by angry and concerned regional communities, including farmers, town business people
and professionals, Indigenous people and individuals representing schools, churches, community organiza-
tions and local governments … [the Guide] provoked despair, anger and anxiety as communities reacted to
what they felt was an attack on their livelihoods. (Windsor Report 2011, p. 4)
Here, we can see how reaction to the Guidemarked a period of delegitimation along the
‘pragmatic’ dimension (row 4, column 4, table 2). Thosewhowould be directly affected did
not see what was ‘in it for them’, and hence pushed back against the Plan itself. Feedback
on the Guide from Basin respondents showed 27 per cent outright opposition, whereas
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only 2 per cent of feedback from the rest of Australia was fundamentally opposed, high-
lighting a distinctly higher level of objection by those most directly affected (MDBA 2011f,
p. 8). Moreover, 33 per cent of consultation respondents fromwithin the Basin rejected the
methods and targets proposed within the Plan, much higher than outside the Basin (6 per
cent) (MDBA 2011f, p. 8). Put together, only 8 per cent of respondents from outside the
Basin rejected either the Plan outright or its methods and targets, compared to 60 per cent
of respondents from within (MDBA 2011f, p. 8). Hence, as one MDBA official noted, the
common reaction from Basin stakeholders was ‘it’s my family, it’s my livelihood’ (MDB-
futures workshop, October 2013), and as another put it, ‘there was a lot of emotion’ and
theMDBAhad to ‘earn back people’s trust’ (interview,MDBA stakeholdermanager, Octo-
ber 2013). One stakeholder response summed up the mood: ‘This Basin Plan will affect me
every day, for the rest of my life’ (Snowden 2012, p. 3). Delegitimation is hencemost visible
on the pragmatic dimension, as stakeholders and the wider public feared for the impact
of SDLs on their socioeconomic wealth and livelihoods.
CONCLUSION: FROM PRIVATE TO PUBLIC?
This article demonstrates the importance of political legitimacy as an institutional
resource for securing the authority of an agency, beyond formal accountability mecha-
nisms. Interestingly, formal mechanisms of accountability were only invoked in this case
when political legitimacy was under threat – the formal parliamentary inquiry launched
in the wake of stakeholder outburst against the Basin Plan. This suggests, at least in
this case, that accountability may have been a secondary mechanism for resetting the
institutional base of the agency to rebuild its political legitimacy, since initial methods
(the public consultation) encountered problems. Political legitimacy – acceptance of the
authority of the agency by stakeholders – was hence of critical importance in this case.
Moreover, the article shows multiple overlapping dimensions along which legitimacy is
won (cognitive and moral) and lost (pragmatic). The article hence demonstrates the value
of a framework analysing three forms of political legitimacy, and may be systematized in
further comparative analysis.
Clearly, the importance of political legitimacy cannot be generalized across all agencies
from a single case. Rather, political legitimacy may be particularly important in similar
‘wicked problem’ policy areas where a new agency is created and has to govern in a highly
volatile, complex, and contested field where formal accountability guarantees may not
be enough to secure legitimacy, and hence authority. Critical reflection is required first,
however, about translating the framework from private to public governance.
Suchman’s (1995) framework was originally used to examine stakeholder engagement
by private firmswithout recourse to traditional state-based legal authority. As such, it pur-
posely broke from traditional frameworks examining public authority because, as Cashore
(2002, p. 505) notes, ‘A focus onmaterial … incentives alone fails to uncover these dynam-
ics’. Applying this framework back onto public authorities might seem paradoxical here.
In the case of theMDBA, collective action problems again appear to be an issue because of
the importance of ‘pragmatic’ considerations. The question hence arises of what value this
approach has. Two responses aremade here, one to justify continued use of the framework,
and the other to stress the need for further methodological/conceptual specification.
First, even though pragmatic legitimacy is important in this case, it is not the only form
of legitimacy the agency seeks, or achieves. As the case shows, legitimacy is sought, and
granted, through sociological processes of publicization/normalization (cognitive) and
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identification with a common normative/ethical project (moral), but is challenged by
socioeconomic arguments (pragmatic). Indeed, given that the SDL policy itself leads to
significant cuts in water usage, ‘pragmatic’ appeals to self-interest were difficult to make;
the agency could not simply show stakeholders how it would be in their immediate
self-interest (because for most it would not!). This led to delegitimation along the prag-
matic dimension, which the agency combated through a stronger strategy along themoral
dimension. Using a moral legitimation strategy in the face of pragmatic delegitimation
enabled the agency to pass the SDL policy. It is this overlapping relationship between
different forms of political legitimacy – both the strategies for achieving it and its external
acceptance/rejection – that mark the value-added of the framework. Legitimacy may be
achieved across one dimension, but then be challenged by stakeholders across another.
Further research using this framework may prove fruitful for uncovering relative dif-
ferences between forms of legitimacy across policy areas and producing policy-relevant
findings for achieving authority in these areas.
Second, despite the potential of the framework, more conceptual and methodological
specification could help its successful application elsewhere. This is particularly the case
for successfully measuring ‘pragmatic’ strategies, which appear relatively absent in this
case, but could potentially be present in more nuanced or less immediately obvious ways
that this study has not picked up, being focused on national public debate and engage-
ment. According to Cashore (2002, p. 517), pragmatic legitimacy is achieved by ‘address-
ing the issue of material self-interests’. This is clearly more difficult to detect in ‘wicked
problem’ contexts where their management requires agencies to focus on long-term soci-
etal benefits, so appeals to ‘direct’ economic interests are less likely. The apparent lack of
pragmatic legitimation strategies may therefore mean not only that different legitimation
strategies are important, but that a more nuanced, contextually sensitive specification of
the ‘pragmatic’ dimensionmay be needed to detect it. One solution is to define it as appeals
to long-term rather than short-term socioeconomic interests.
Public agencies may appeal to self-interests, but in a less obvious way than private reg-
ulatory institutions. Moreover, analysing not only public engagement strategies, but also
private conversations and consultations with important stakeholders may identify these
sensitive, nuanced strategies. While methodologically intensive, the use of freedom of
information requests and similar tools can facilitate analysis of these informal processes.
A broader appreciation of the tactics employed, and intricate identification of the audi-
ences targeted and the times and places particular strategies are used, is key for building
a systematic theory of the political legitimacy of delegated agencies.
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